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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
case,"0 Justices Douglas" and Frankfurter r-' impliedly reserved the question
as to whether an executive agreement would be valid if it impaired the
constitutional rights of an American citizen.
In the instant case the United States Army took possession of the
plaintiff's property as an officers' club in 1945, and when the plaintiff
visited the property in 1948 she discovered it to be greatly damaged. The
plaintiff filed a claim with the Army asserting that her property had been
taken by the United States for public use and therefore she was entitled
to just compensation.'' The United States contended that although the
property belonged to an American citizen, it was "enemy territory"' 4 and
therefore subject to seizure.'5 1h plaintiff contended that Austria was
not enemy territory at the time of the taking, in July 1945, but was a
liberated country.u The Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The trend of the decisions in this area of de facto sovereignty has
been to extend the operation of constitutional privileges and immunities.
However, the extent to which the provisions of the Constitution will be
applied to any given case apparently depends upon the special facts of
the case; no safe generalizations can be made. The relationship between
the claimant and the sovereignty which the United States may hold in
the particular area would be a significant factor. Perhaps the most
important of the considerations is the fact that the injury was the result
of an action by an instrumentality of the United States.
WILLIAM JAY GoLnwoR?,t
CRIMINAL LAW-INCEST-CONSENT
The defendant, half-brother of the prosecutrix, was convicted of first
degree rape and incest. He moved for an order arresting judgment and
setting aside the verdict on the grounds that the crimes of rape and incest
are mutually exclusive and cannot arise from the same act. Held, if the
parties are within the prescribed lines of consanguinity, proof of first
degree rape may result in a dual conviction of rape and incest. People v.
Wilson, 135 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1954).
The defendant's contention was that acts constituting rape must
necessarily be effectuated without the female's consent, while such consent
is an essential element of the crime of incest. Courts generally agree that
the crime of rape requires an absence of consent.1  But such accord is
10. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
11. Id. at 227.
12. Id. at 236.
13. Filbin Corp. v. United States, 266 Fed. 911 (D.C. Cir. 1920); Lajoie v. Milliken,
242 Mass. 508, 136 N. E. 419, 423 (1922).
14. Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39 (1879).
15. The Juragua Iron Co., Ltd. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909),
16. H. R. Doc. No. 351, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); 15 DEP'T STATE BULL.
384-864 (1946).
1. See 44 Am. JuR., Rape § 8 (1942).
CASENOTES
not found in the interpretation of incest statutes. One heavily supported
line of authority holds that the crime of incest may occur without the
consent of both parties,2 as where the female is coerced by force or fraud3
or does not have legal capacity to give her consent.4 A few of these courts
permit the prosecutor to elect whether to indict for rape or incest or
both.5  Other jurisdictions, however, in construing their incest statutes, 6
2. E.g., Smith v. State, 108 Ala. 1, 19 So. 306 (1896); State v. Haston, 64 Ariz.
72, 166 P.2d 141 (1946) (by implication) in which the court said: "The commission
of the crime of rape in the instant case necessarily carries with it the commission of
the crime of incest .... " Here the defendant had raped his three daughters, ages 8,
14, and 15. McCaskill v. State, 55 Fla. 117, 45 So. 843 (1908); State v. Chambers, 87
Iowa 1, 53 NAV. 1090 (1893) in which it was stated that the phrase the "act
must be willingly done" applies only to the party who cosnmits the offense; State v.
Swindall, 129 La. 760, 56 So. 702 1911 ; State v. Hughes, 108 N.J.L. 64, 154 At].
867 (1931), rev'd on other grounds 109 N.J.L. 189, 160 AtI. 492; State v. Hittson, 57
N.M. 100, 254 P. 2d 1063 (1953); State v. Robinson, 83 Ohio St. 136, 93 N. E. 623
(1910) (The court gave its opinion that the elements of the crime of incest are present
whether the act be done with or without her consent, saying: ". . . it is not less
incest because the element of rape is added . . ."); Signs v. State, 35 Okla. Crim. 340,
250 Pac. 938 (1926); State v. Coffey, 8 Wash. 2d 504, 112 P.2d 989 (1941).
3. E.g., Smith v. State, supra note 2; State v. McCall, 63 N.W. 2d 874 (1954)
(by implication); State v. Columbus, 9 N.J. Misc. 512, 154 At]. 605 (1931) (by
implication) (The court commented: "We think that the gist of the crime of incest
is sexual intercourse within the prohibited degrees, and that, while a father may
commit rape upon his daughter, the crime is incest as well, and indictment for either
will lie. . ."); State v. Hughes, supra note 2; State v. Hittson, supra note 2. (The
court stated that it was immaterial whether the defendant used force, fear or persuasion.
and it was immaterial that the same testimony would have sustained a conviction for
rape).
4. E.g., State v. Haston, supra note 2; McCaskill v. State, supra note 2 (Here
the prosecutrix was age 12); State v. Swindall, supra note 2 (The charge was that
consent could not affect the issue of the crime of incest where the prosecutrix was
under age); People v. Gibson, 301 N.Y. 244, 93 N.E. 2d 827 (1950) This court
stated that a girl who could not legally consent to intercourse could not legally consent
to incestuous intercourse:
Such a female could never be found guilty of the crime of incest because
the law, for obvious reasons of public policy, declares that she is unable to
consent to sexual intercourse, incestuous or otherwise.
Therefore, the court reasoned, she could never be an accomplice to such an act; Signs
v. State, supra note 2; State v. McCall, supra note 3.
5. Smith v. State, supra note 2; McCaskill v. State, supra note 2; State v. Chambers,
supra note 2.
6. Typical Incest Statutes are as follows: Fr.A. SAT. §§ 741.21, 741.22 (1953):
A man may not marry any woman to whom he is related by lineal
consanguinity, nor his sister, nor his aunt, nor his niece. A woman may not
marry any man to whom she is related by lineal consanguinity, nor her brother,
nor her uncle, nor her nephew.
Persons within the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are
prohibited or declared by law to be incestuous and void, who intermarry or
commit adultery or fornication with each other, shall be punished by imprison-
merit in the state prison not exceeding twenty years, or in the county jail not
exceeding one year.
N.Y. PENAL Aw § 1110:
When persons, within the degrees of consanguinity, within which marriages
are declared by lw to be incestuous and void, intermarry or commit adultery
or fornication with each other, each of them is punishable by imprisonment
for not more than ten years.
VA. CODE § 18-82 (1950):
If any person commit adultery or fornication, he shall be fined not less
than twenty dollars. And if he commit adultery or fornication with any
MIAM! LAW QUARTERLY
hold that words such as "with each other" mean "willingly" and, therefore,
that consent is a necessary element of incest. 7  Thc infrequently-used but
original view is that consent is not absolute, and, while there may not
be sufficient lack of conscnt to constitute rape, the degree of absence of
assent may still be enough to vindicate the female of guilt of incest, Of
course, in states where this view is followed, if the amount of force is
sufficient to constitute rape, there can be no incest. Attempts to maintain
that lack of consent, or force, is a necessary element of incest have not
been upheld.0  In addition to these conflicting views, there are several
jurisdictions which have not yet resolved the question of whether or not
consent is a necessary clement of incest."' Thus, it is apparent, there
is no unanimity on this issue.
person, whom he is forbidden by law to marry, he shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, provided however that if he commit adultery or fornication
with his daughter or his granddaughter, lie shall be confined in the penitentiary
not less than one nor more than ten years or, in the descretion of the court
or jury trying the case, confined in jail not exceeding twelve months and by
fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, either or both.
7. E.g., State v, Learned, 74 Kan. 328, 85 Pac. 293 (1906) (The court felt
that Kansas was an exception because tie statute denounced penalty against both
equally, while somc state statutes do not. On the question of whether a girl under 18
could consent to incest and be prosecuted, the court said she could assent to incest
but not to rape, so that both could be charged with incest although statutory rape
was present. However, the court followed, different evidence is needed for rape and
incest, so prosecution for one is not a bar to the other); People v. Harriden, I Park
Crim. 344 (N.Y. 1852); State v. Jarvis, 18 Ore. 360, 23 Pac. 251 (1890); State v.
Janis, 20 Ore. 437, 26 Pac. 302 (1891) (The court said that joint consent is the
essence of the crime; if the act is by force, the offense is rape and not incest).
8. Raiford v. State, 68 Ga. 672 (1882); Contra, Whidby v. State, 121 Ga. 588,
49 S. E. 811 (1905) ("The law recognizes no intermediate degree of force in the
accomplishment of an illegal act of sexual intercourse which is sufficient to accomplish
the act contrary to the consent of the female, and yet not constitute the crime
of rape ....")
9. State v. Jones, 233 Iowa 843, 10 N. W. 2d 526 (1943) (The defendant alleged
that lack of consent was necessary in order to sustain a charge of incest. The court
affirmed the conviction saying that lack of consent, or force, is not an essential element
of incest. The dissenting opinion discussed the issue of whether or not a girl aged
eight could consent to incest and whether the no consent statute applies only to rape.
Tie distinguishing characteristic, it said, is the closeness of the relationship, not the
youthfulness of one of the participants as in statutory rape. It was pointed out that
the general rule is that lack of consent is not necessary for incest, but that lack of
consent will be implied by law in incest upon a girl under the age of consent. However,
the dissenting fraction felt that closeness of relationship is insufficient basis for a
different rule in these two situations); State v. McCall, 63 N. XV. 2d 874 (1954)("Incest is not essentially an offense against the person of the female. It is an offense
with her, . . . Neither force nor violence nor lack of consent are essential elements
of that offense.")
10. Holding mutual consent not necessary: People v. Stratton, 141 Cal. 604,
75 Pac. 166 (1904); People v. Rouse, 2 Mich. N.P. 209 (1871); T th v. State, 141 Neb.
448, 3 N.W,2d 899 (1942) (by implication); Contra, People v. Patterson, 102 Cal.
239, 36 Pac. 436 (1894)(IHolding that although the consent of both is necessary, one
may be indicted alone, since one can be guilty where the other is not, as where only
one knows of the relationship); People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305 (1858); De Groat v.
People, 39 Mich. 124 (1878); Yeoman v. State, 21 Neb. 171, 31 N.W. 669 (1887)
(The court assumed the theory that both must be guilty or neither, but commented
that both need not be prosecuted jointly).
CASENOTES
In People v. Gibson," a decision preceding the present case, the
Court of Appeals of New York stated that, while a female under the age
of legal consent could not be an accomplice to an act of incest because
of her inability to consent, the male participant could be convicted even
though the statute held each punishable.' 2 The court, in the principal
case, reasoned that if incest could arise from statutory rape, as explained
above, it could also arise from first degree rape, since in either situation
no consent exists.
In the instant case the defendant relied in part on People v. Harriden'3
where the court had decided that the statute applied only where there
was mutual consent, and excluded cases in which force was used. However,
the court in People v. Wilson felt that rape cases should not be exceptions
to the incest statute, stating that had the legislature so intended, it would
have expressed itself accordingly. The court ruled that, since no exclusion
was expressed, and since incest could be founded on statutory rape, the
crime of incest could also be based on proof of first degree rape.'
4
The delineation of the act of incest as criminal and the penalties
affixed thereto are solely statutory.' It seems that the very purpose of
the statutes which punish incest is to prohibit intercourse between family
members, thereby preserving the closeness and sanctity of the family
circle. If mutual consent were an element of this offense, an offender
who used force would be beyond the reach of the statute while a more
peaceable individual committing the same act would be guilty. Because
of the difficulty in proving rape, the user of violence might escape penalty
altogether. This would seem to be a direct contravention of the intent
of the legislature. Does society, while punishing a man who committed
a robbery, at the same time permit another who committed armed robbery
to go free because he added a dangerous weapon to the act? Similarly, the
element of coerciveness or force should not be an avenue of escape for
the violent.
TALA ENGrL
11. See note 4 supra.
12. See note 6 supra. (A full discussion of this problem may be found in People
v. Wilson. The court stated that generally, if the female does consent, she is an
accomplice to the act and her testimony must be corroborated in order to convict.
If she does not consent, she is not an accomplice and this testimony alone will be
sufficient evidence on which to base a conviction. The difficulties of obtaining
corroborating evidence in such cases are apparent. See also N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.
§ 399.)
13. 1 Park Crim. 344 (N.Y. 1852).
14. 135 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (1954).
15. Incest as an indictable offense did not exist at common law. See the
discussion of the ecclesiastical and secular views in 27 AM. JUR., Incest § 1 (1942).
